This paper investigates whether there are country-specific characteristics in goalscoring in the final stage of important international football matches. We examine goal-scoring from 1960 onwards in full 'A' international matches of six national teams:
There are clear analogies between sports economics and labor economics. As Kahn (2000) indicates professional sports offers a unique opportunity for labor market research, for example to establish the impact of incentives on behavior. According to Szymanski (2003) sports provide information about labor market behavior. Winning a sporting contest depends on relative, not on absolute performance. Talent will migrate to wherever it is most valued. This general rule may apply to club teams, but, apart from some naturalization it does not apply to national teams. National teams are different from club teams. Players are not bought and sold; their eligibility to play depends on their nationality. Once a player has represented a country by playing for the national 'A' team in a non-friendly match, the player is not allow to play in a different national team. Thus, national teams have more or less exogenously given resources as the labor market for players is restricted on the basis of nationality.
Playing for the national 'A' team is never the main job. However, there are clear incentives to participate in national teams because the market value, i.e. earnings capacity goes up once a player has been selected for a national team. Furthermore, it is usually considered such an "honor" to be chosen that hardly any player declines an invitation. So, one would expect that the performance of national teams is related to talent skills and not to incentives. The common element within a team is the team spirit since (most) players share the same "national identity" whatever this may be. In our paper we investigate country-specific goal-scoring in important international football matches. We focus on goal-scoring in the "dying seconds" because there the national identity becomes apparent.
Italian teams are well-known for their defensive tactics, while Brazilian and Dutch teams are famous for their beautiful style of play while Germans have built a reputation of persistence and conviction never to give up before the "final whistle".
The link between goal-scoring behavior of football players and behavior of individual workers is not straightforward. Whereas in the case of goal scoring in the last minute there is almost an immediate effect of effort on results for common workers this is less obvious.
Workers putting in effort in their job will not immediately experience the results from this effort. Nevertheless, from our paper it will become clear that national identity influence the behavior of football players. When explaining cross-country differences in economic 2 performance this may be taken into account.
We investigate the goal-scoring in the last minute(s) of football matches by analyzing goal-scoring in more than 1500 important football matches which the national teams of Belgium, Brazil, England, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands played since 1960. 1 These matches included qualifiers for the European and World Cup, and matches at the final tournaments of either of these two events, the Copa America and the Confederations Cup. Table 1 shows the importance of these countries in international football in the past five The set-up of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide anecdotal evidence of the importance of goal-scoring in the final minutes of important international football matches. Section 3 briefly discusses previous studies. Section 4 gives a description of our data and presents parameter estimates. As we show, our empirical analysis indicates that there is indeed evidence of German goal-scoring in the final stages of football matches not being just a myth. We also provide evidence of a home advantage. National teams that play at home are more likely to score goals and more likely to win their matches. Section 5 presents information from penalty shootouts. In Section 6 we explain our findings and conclude.
Anecdotal evidence
Other than one might think, the ability to score goals in the last minutes is not randomly distributed across countries. There is abundant anecdotal evidence on this, especially regarding the impressive performance of the German national team. As Gary Lineker has 1 The four continental European countries are praised for their contribution to the development of football tactics (Kuper and Szymanski, 2009) . England is the country where professional football started.
Brazil plays football beyond comprehension.
3 stated: "Football is a simple game; 22 men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans win." 2 Michel Platini, the current chairman of the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) once said: "When the Germans play well they become world champion; if they play poor they reach the final." 3 The German success is partly owing to their ability to score goals in the final minutes, which provoked the Dutch comedian Youp van 't Hek to the statement that "Germans are only defeated when the bus has taken them out of town." Vergouw (2006) presents an analysis of the myths surrounding the (West-)German national team. One of these myths is that, in crucial matches, the Germans often score in the final minute.
The first occasion on which the (West-)German national football team decided an important match in the final stages was the 1954 World Cup final in Bern (Switzerland).
Attacker Helmut Rahn scored the winning goal (3-2) against Hungary in the eighty-fifth minute. After only eight minutes, the "Mighty Magyars" had been ahead 2-0. Even this early Hungarian lead did not prevent West-Germany from winning their first World Cup.
Some commentators even consider this event as the true beginning of the new Federal
Republic of Germany after the second World War. The general feeling that the Federal Republic of Germany was to be taken serious again boosted confidence and was a stimulus to the miraculous post-war economic development, the so called "Wirtschaftswunder" 2 Gary Lineker (1960) Turkey took the lead, then Germany equalized, Germany seemed to have decided the match eleven minutes before the end, but then Turkey equalized in the eighty-sixth minute.
However, right-footed left-back Lahm opened the door to the final for Germany in the last minute.
The successes of the German national team are sometimes attributed to German attitude and planning: "The German national team plays the way its general staff prepared for the war; games are meticulously planned, each player skilled in both attack and de-6 fense. Intricate pass patterns evolve, starting right in front of the German goal. Anything achievable by human foresight, careful preparation and hard work is accounted for. (...)
At the same time, the German national team suffers from the same disability as the famous Schlieffen plan for German strategy in World War I. There is a limit to human foresight;
psychological stress on those charged with executing excessively complex maneuvers cannot be calculated in advance. If the German team falls behind, or if its intricate approach yields no results, its game is shadowed by the underlying national premonition that in the end even the most dedicated effort will go unrewarded, by the nightmare that ultimately fate is cruel -a nightmare reinforced by the knowledge that the German media are unmerciful when high expectations go unfulfilled. The impression is unavoidable that an outstanding national soccer team has not brought a proportionate amount of joy to a people that may not in its heart of hearts believe joy is the ultimate national destiny" (Kissinger, 1986) .
While the first citation may make sense, the second quote may be stretching the evidence too much. No team seems to have come back from a desperate position to get victory or at least a shot at survival as frequently as the Germans. One should remember Since July 2006 the FIFA ranking is the sum of the current year performance and a three-year weighted average of previous annual performances. Annual performance is measured by average points per game, which are determined by the outcome and the importance of the match, the strength of the opponent and the strength of regional confederation. Leeds and Leeds (2009) use the new ranking to investigate how it is affected by country-specific differences, finding similar results as before; it helps to be big in terms of population and rich in terms of per capita GDP. Kuper and Szymanski (2009) (240). Germany provides the highest number of matches (344), which has to do with the fact that until 1990 Germany consisted of two countries with their own national team. Approximately 1 in 3 matches is a home match. Table 3 shows the importance of scoring in the last minute or in the last five minutes.
On average in 4.0 percent of the 1564 available matches a goal is scored in the last minute (13.9 percent in the last five minutes), while in 1.9 percent of the matches the countries got a goal against (6.8 percent in the last five minutes). Clearly the countries in our sample predominantly have strong football teams as in the last time periods the number of goals scored always exceed the number of goals incurred. The exception is Belgium who in 228 matches only have scored six goals in the last minute but also conceded half a dozen goals in the last minute. From table 3 some confirmation about the validity of the German goal-scoring myth may be derived. Whereas in 4.0 percent of all matches a goal is scored in the last minute, German teams succeed to do this in 5.5 percent of their matches. Note, however, that the Netherlands have even scored in the last minute in 5.9 percent of their matches. Dobson and Goddard (2001) argue that scoring rates tend to increase with the duration of the match elapsed. A possible explanation is that players tend to get tired as matches progress, increasing the likelihood of mistakes and therefore goals. An alternative explanation is that the scoring rate increases because of the rise in the probability of the scores being unequal. Table 4 shows the intensities by which goals are scored and conceded over the evolution of 90 minutes matches. In the first quarter goals are scored with an intensity of 1.7 percent per minute, while they are conceded with 0.7 percent per minute. These frequencies go up in the second quarter of the matches. However, the average goal-scoring intensity in the second quarter of the matches is as high as the goal-scoring intensity between the 76 th and the 85 th minute of the match, 2.1 percent per minute. The goal-conceding intensity increases gradually from 0.8 percent per minute in the second quarter to 1.2 percent per minute between the 76 th and the 85 th minute of the match. In other words, we hardly find an increase in the scoring rates as the matches evolve. It is possible that the quality of the players in the national teams is so high that they do not get as tired towards the end of the game as is the case in domestic league games where the average quality of the players is substantially lower. Nevertheless, the goal-scoring and goal-conceding intensities are somewhat higher in the 86 th to the 89 th minute and substantially higher in the last minute of the matches, an intensity of 3.9 percent for goals scored and 1.8 percent for goal conceded. 5 Figure 1 shows the evolution of goal-scoring over the duration of the match for the separate countries. Clearly, all countries score more goals than they concede, although for Belgium the differences between goal-scoring and goal-conceding are small. As shown, for every country except Brazil and Italy, the goal-scoring intensity is higher in the last minute than it is in the four minutes before that. Also, for every country except for Italy and Brazil, the goal-conceding intensity in the last minute is lower than in the four minutes before that. The increase in the goal-scoring intensity in the last minute is very large in the England, Germany and the Netherlands. For Germany, there is a parallel increase in the goal-scoring rate and the goal-conceding rate in the last minute. We will analyze the goal-scoring and goal-conceding intensities in more detail below.
Parameter estimates exploratory analysis
We present simple and straightforward linear models to explain the probability to score in the last minute (last five minutes) of a game or conceding a goal in the last minute (last five minutes). Panel a of Table 5 shows the parameter estimates of a simple linear probability model in which Brazil is the reference country and data from 1960 onwards are used. 6 As shown in the first column there is no home advantage for scoring goals in the last minute. Furthermore, England, Germany and the Netherlands are about 3.5-4.5 percent more likely to score goals in the last minute than Brazil is. Belgium and Italy also have a higher last minute goal-scoring probability than Brazil, but the parameter estimates are not different from zero at conventional levels of significance. The second column shows that there is no home effect in conceding goals in the last minute either. Furthermore, Belgium and Germany have a significant higher probability than Brazil to concede a goal.
Germany is 4.5 percent more likely than Brazil to score a goal in the last minute, but also 4.3 percent more likely to concede a goal in the last minute. The third and fourth column of panel a of Table 5 show that in the last five minutes of a match there seems to be a home advantage. Teams playing at home have a 4.2 percent higher probability to score at home and a 2.3 percent lower probability to concede a goal at home. Furthermore, the Netherlands have the highest probability to score a goal in the last five minutes while Germany has the highest probability to concede a goal in the last five minutes of a match.
Clearly Germany is an "outlier" in terms of goal-scoring, as it is most likely to score in the last minutes and also most likely to concede a goal in the last minutes. Sofar, we ignored the fact that for a long period of time Germany had two national teams representing East-Germany and West-Germany. Therefore, panel b of Table 5 shows the parameter estimates when we limit the time period to 1990-2009. Basically, the pattern of goal-scoring in the last minute is not much different, confirming the results presented in panel a that Germany is more likely to score a goal and more likely to concede a goal in the last minute than Brazil is. 7 Also England and the Netherlands are more likely to score a goal in the last minute.
Parameter estimates rates of scoring and conceding goals
To investigate the goal-scoring rates over the evolution of matches in more detail we use a hazard model, in which the rate by which goals are scored is dependent on the elapsed duration of the match t and some observed characteristics x, i.e. the country and the calendar time period:
where k (= 1,..,5) is a subscript for duration interval and I k (t) are time-varying dummy variables that are one in subsequent duration intervals. We distinguish duration intervals (in minutes): 1-15, 16-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61-75, 76-85, 86-89, 90 . Because we also estimate a constant term, we normalize λ 1 = 0. Furthermore, β represents a vector of parameters and the λ's are the main parameters of interest. The conditional density functions of the durations until a goal is scored can be written as
Assuming that conditional on the observed characteristics and the elapsed duration of the match, the goal-scoring events are independent we can specify the log-likelihood function as follows:
where n k represents the number of goals scored in interval k and d k is the duration of interval k in minutes. We estimate the parameters of the model using Maximum Likelihood.
The goal-conceding rate is estimated similarly. Table 6 shows the parameter estimates for the rates by which teams score and concede goals. There is a clear home advantage. Teams playing at home score more goals and concede fewer goals. The first column gives the parameter estimates if we interact country and goal-scoring intensity in the last minute -including stoppage time. As shown, goalscoring intensity is highest for Brazil and lowest for Belgium (the reference country). From the second quarter to the 85 th minute the goal-scoring intensity is higher than in the first quarter, but there is no obvious increase in goal-scoring intensity. From the 86 th to the 89 th minute the goal-scoring intensity and goal-conceding intensity increases. In the last minute there is a difference between on the one hand Belgium, Brazil and Italy for whom the goal-scoring intensity does not increase significantly and on the other hand England, Germany and the Netherlands for whom the goal-scoring intensity is significantly higher than before.
The second column shows the parameter estimates if we restrict some of the interaction terms between country and goals in the last minute. Those that were insignificant in the first estimate are restricted to zero. The interaction effects in the 90 th minute for England, Germany and the Netherlands are imposed to be the same. From a Likelihood-Ratio test it appears that we cannot reject the statistical validity of these restrictions. In the third column we restrict all interactions between country and duration intervals to be equal to zero. A Likelihood Ratio test shows that in this case the value of the loglikelihood drops significantly, i.e. we cannot reject the hypothesis that these interaction terms are significantly different from zero. From this, we conclude that for the six countries in our sample there is at most a mild increase in the goal-scoring intensity over the duration of the match. The Netherlands, England and Germany exhibit a significant higher scoring intensity in the last minute.
The fourth to six columns of Table 6 show a similar analysis of the goal-conceding rates. The goal-conceding rate was higher in the 1960s than in the following decades, but over time the goal-conceding intensity did not change since the 1970s. Belgium has the highest goal-conceding intensity, while Germany has the lowest. The other countries are 13 not very different from each other. Over the duration of the match, the goal-conceding intensity increases to remain approximately constant in the last 30 minutes of the match.
Above all, Germany has a substantially higher goal-conceding intensity in the 90 th minute than the other five countries. 8
Winning and losing in the "dying seconds"
Does it matter, whether teams play at home? It does matter, as shown in Table 7 , where we show the parameter estimates for the probability to win or lose a match. Teams are about 20 percent more likely to win if they play at home and 12 to 16 percent less likely to lose if they play at home. Does it matter whether a goal is scored in the last minute in a game? It does, in fact it is very important. If a team scores in the last minute, it is 21 to 26 percent more likely to win and 12 to 14 percent less likely to lose the match. 
Penalty shootouts
Sometimes goals in international tournaments are scored in penalty shootouts. When two teams are tied in an elimination game, and extra time cannot provide a resolution, a decision has to be reached differently. Initially, a replay was the solution but from 1976 onwards in the European Championship and from 1982 onwards in the World Cup penalty kicks were used to decide the game. The procedure is as follows. Five players from each team take one kick each. If the score is still equal after these 10 kicks, one player from each team takes a kick until one team has scored a goal more than the other from the same number of kicks. Jordet et al. (2007) perform a statistical analysis to establish the relationship between results of individual penalty kicks during a penalty shootout and potential determinants such as stress, skill and fatigue. Analyzing the outcome of penalty kicks in all 41 penalty shootouts and 409 kicks taken in the World Cup, European
Championships, and Copa America between 1976 and 2004 they find that the importance of the kicks -indicative of stress -was negatively related to the outcomes of the kicks, whereas skill and fatigue were less, or not, related to outcome. 
Conclusions
Scoring goals is a team effort, although it helps to have a good striker who makes it easier to transfer team effort into results. Scoring goals is also determined by the support of the crowd watching the game. We find that national teams have a clear home advantage when playing important matches. On average they are more likely to score goals and less likely to concede goals. On average, the probability to win a match is almost 20% higher if played at home while the probability to lose a match is about 15% lower if played at home. The probability to win a match is also determined by the quality of the team.
Although the differences between the best national teams tend to get smaller. Overall in the period 1960-2009 Brazil had a much better track record of winning games than for example Italy, Germany, England and the Netherlands. However, this is determined by the performance in the early years as over the period 1990-2009 the differences are much smaller. Differences between national teams not only occur in terms of overall goal scoring and goal conceding or in the probabilities to win or lose but also in the evolution of goal 15 scoring over the course of the match. Apparently not only skills but also national identity seems to matter.
We tried to relate our findings to work on national identity to Hofstede's work on culture. Hofstede (1980) demonstrated that there are national cultural groupings that affect the behavior of organizations, distinguishing several dimensions. We find support for the idea that there are differences in national identity which affect goal scoring behavior of national teams. However, the differences in behavior between national teams cannot be related on any of these dimensions. 9
Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) note that football is used as a vehicle for the expression of nationalism and for the promotion of individual nations' power and status internationally.
As discussed before, in the decades after World War II Germany football contributed to the process of nation building. According to Foer (2004) matches, which they consider to be support for the idea that national cultures of violence accompany the football players as they move to Europe (see also Kuper, 2006) .
the best players to move to competitions where the highest salaries are paid: England (Premier League), Spain (La Liga) and Italy (Serie A). Also at the level of national teams differences are becoming smaller since players play all over Europe in various clubs. Still, there may be cultural differences that remain at the level of national teams, maybe not in tactics or in strategy but in fighting spirit. This is what we find in our empirical analysis.
A popular myth in football is that the German national team is never defeated until the last whistle is blown. This is confirmed in matches that were decided through penalty shootouts. The German national team outperforms the other five countries, both during World Cup matches and the European championships. Furthermore, the German national team is more likely to score in the "dying seconds" of a match than other national teams are. We expose this myth to an empirical test by investigating goal-scoring in the last minutes of important international matches. We find that indeed Germans are more likely to score in the last minute of important games than other countries are. However, also
England and the Netherlands are more likely to score a goal in the last minute whereas
Germany is also more likely to concede a goal in the last minute.
So, whereas in goal-scoring there is a random element which makes football matches all the more exciting to watch, there is also persistence in performance of national teams with Brazil and Germany almost always performing well. Surprisingly, there is also a country-specific element in goal-scoring in the last minutes of football matches. Whereas general performance has to do with talent, goal-scoring in the last minutes seems to be related to attitude. Whereas the national team from Brazil and Italy do not like to lose and reduce their effort to score a goal in the last minutes for to avoid conceding a goal England, Germany and the Netherlands are risk seeking, increasing their effort to score a goal at the risk of conceding one. Only for Germany we find that the risk of conceding a goal increases significant. Apparently, Germany wants to win whatever the costs may be.
Comparative to the home advantage, the effect of goal scoring in the last minute on the probability to win a match is quite large. Nevertheless, goal scoring in the last minute does not happen very often. Therefore, the effects of the German attitude on winning a match, though significant, is small. 1989, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2007 1983, 1991, 1995 England 7 -- 12 1972, 1980, 1996 1976, 1992, 2008 Italy 7 1962, 1970, 1994, 2002 1998 England 9 1966 -Germany 12* 1974 , 1990 1966 , 1982 , 1986 Italy 12* 1982 1970 , 1994 Netherlands 6 -1974 , 1978 Note: Participation refers to the number of times a national team participated in a tournament. A * indicates that a national team was present in every tournament. 1960-2009: 1564; 1990-2009: 768 ; Brazil = reference country; note that the 90 th minute includes extra time; parameters of linear probability models; in parentheses absolute t statistics based on robust standard errors; all estimates contain calendar period fixed effects. 
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Germany
Home 0.37 (10.0)** 0.37 (10.0)** 0.37 (10.1)** -0.42 (6.8)** -0.42 (6.9)** -0.42 (6.9)** 1960-2009 1990-2009 1960-2009 1990-2009 Home 0.19 (7.6)** 0.18 ( Note that the 90 th minute includes extra time.
Countries
